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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH

FAY I. PIXTONf
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE CO. OF BLOOMINGTON,
ILLINOIS, and INTERNATIONAL
REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, INC.

CASE No.900119

Defendants/Respondents.

Priority 16

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
FAY I. PIXTON

INTRODUCTION
This reply brief addresses points raised in
respondent's brief and attempts to clarify the facts and
issues presented in this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Fay I. Pixton, seeks a reversal of the
Order and Judgment of the District Court granting
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Such a reversal

would enable Plaintiff to proceed in an action against
Defendant on a claim of bad faith and fraud.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO
PURSUE HER CLAIMS FOR BAD
FAITH AND FRAUD
Plaintiff by this Appeal is not seeking additional
damages as a result of the actions of Davies and Hothan.
That claim was settled for $7,500.00.

Plaintiff seeks

damages against State Farm for impairing her ability to
effectively settle her case personally without the use of
counsel.

This right to settle her third party claim was

adversely affected by State Farm's lack of good faith and
fair dealing during the payment of PIP benefits.
Defendant's argument that there is no privity of contract
between the parties is an incorrect statement.
Defendant in its Argument on Point I cites
numerous authorities dealing with first-party claims and
third party claims and the duties arising from those
relationships.

Beck's affidavit in this case dealt as much

with the first party claim as the third party claim.

His

affidavit recognized the "conflict of interest" where both
parties are insured by the same company and only one
adjuster is assigned to handle both claims.

This

arrangement was the choice of State Farm not the Plaintiff.
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Further, his affidavit dealt with the involvement of IRA,
non-disclosure, and the mis-characterization of IRA's
charges as file expenses.

The District Court should have

viewed this evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff;
however by completely rejecting the affidavit he committed
reversible error.
Also, Defendant appears to be arguing that
insurance bad faith can only be based on a contract theory
to the exclusion of a tort theory.

In annotation #3 Beck v.

Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985) the
following language by the Court demonstrates a viable cause
of action in tort or fraud may be filed in first party cases:
"We recognize that in some cases the acts
constituting a breach of contract may also
result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract and may give
rise to causes of action in tort. Hal
Taylor Assoc, v. Union America, 657 P.2d
at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins.
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the
law of this state recognizes a duty to
refrain from intentionally causing severe
emotional distress to others. Samms v. Eccles,
11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961). Thus,
intentional and outrageous conduct by an
insurer against an insured, coupled with a
failure to bargain, could conceivably result
in tort liability independent of (and concurrent
with) liability for breach of contract.
Additionally, the facts that give rise to a
breach of the duty to bargain in good faith
could also amount to fraudulent activity,
rendering an insurer independently liable for
damages flowing from the fraud. See Wetherbee
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v, United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. 2d 921, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1968) . Also, under various
unfair practices acts, there may be
statutory requirements that give rise to
independent causes of action. E.g., U.C.A.,
1953, §§ 31-27-1 to-24".
How could the Court rule that there was no
conflict of interest on the part of Felix Jensen handling
the claims for both parties, where it appears from the cases
and the affidavit of Mr. Beck that its customary in the
insurance industry to have two adjusters handle such cases?
If the District Court was obligated to view the evidence in
a light most favorable to appellant, how could it disregard
Beck's affidavit?

The fact that the issues involved with

the sums paid by State Farm to IRA could have been resolved
in Judge Frederick's Court, should not be a basis for
denying appellant the right to establish State Farm's bad
faith or fraud.
A jury could reasonably infer "bad faith11 and
"fraud" from the evidence that State Farm's actions in
mischaracterizing specials, not advising Pixton about using
nurses as non-testimonial experts preparing for trial, not
advising Pixton about IRA's actual function of minimizing
medical expenses as opposed to providing rehabilitation and
not offering the $7,500.00 based upon $871.51 specials when
it first offered the $2,500.00 in 1984, rather than some
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five (5) years later.

The liability in this case was

undeniable and clear and the facts known to State Farm at
the time it offered $2f500.00 to Plaintiff were identical to
those 5 years later when $7,500.00 was offered.

This delay

was clearly unreasonable based upon the foregoing facts.
POINT II
SETTLEMENT OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
AGAINST DAVIES AND HOTHAN DID
NOT CONSTITUTE A WAIVER
The Defendant's claim that Plaintiff was given the
information concerning the cost of IRA's services more than
one year prior to her settlement with Davies and Hothan is
partially true.

Plaintiff was given copies of the various

checks paid by State Farm to IRA but the services for which
payments were made were not provided.

In order to determine

whether the payments were actually "file expenses" rather
than "medical specials" the nature of the services had to be
identified.
It was because of State Farm's complete control of
the first and third party claims that it was able to
mis-characterize the IRA payments to the detriment of
Plaintiff.

State Farm insured both Plaintiff and Defendant

and decided to handle the claim using one adjuster contrary
to accepted insurance practice.
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That is of course, if

Beck's affidavit in this case is given any effect.
In an action for failure to settle within the
policy limits, the insurance company is charged with acting
in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney in fact representing
the insured's interest in litigation.

The company's

interest comes into conflict with that of the insured's
while representing him; and arguably, acting in its own
interests to the detriment of the insured's interest while
acting in such a fiduciary capacity is a tort.
In the present case, State Farm undertook the
fiduciary duty to represent the insured's interest by not
appointing two adjusters.

It did in the course of

representing Plaintiff violate its fiduciary duty arising
out of sole control of the settlement.

This was true at

least until Pixton obtained independent counsel, but by then
the damage had been done.

The IRA employees had completed

their task of minimizing medicals and the specials could
then be mis-characterized as "file expenses".
There is in the record no factual or legal basis
upon which to make a finding or conclusion that Plaintiff
waived her claims of "bad faith" and "fraud" against State
Farm.

The settlement of the Davies and Hothan case occurred

June 13, 1989, the day of trial.
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The affirmative defense in

Defendant's answer dated April 1, 1987 and the second answer
dated May 23, 1989, referred to Plaintiff's conduct not the
settlement.

Obviously, based upon the dates the defense was

raised it had to refer to actions or conduct that occurred
prior to the settlement.

If State Farm had intended the

dismissal of this action it could have demanded that as part
of the $7f500.00 settlement but that was not done nor did
Plaintiff intend such a result.
On page 6 of respondent's brief, respondent states
that Plaintiff failed to press for a ruling at trial in Judge
Frederick's Court.

Plaintiff filed a motion just prior to

trial in that case to have the Court review the checks paid
by State Farm to IRA to determine their admissibility.

The

Court refused to hear the motion without giving any reason.
The Plaintiff could not attempt to introduce the checks
because they contained the insurance company's name and
contained no information about services provided.

Plaintiff

felt constrained to accept the settlement because of those
procedural problems.

In any event, the $7,500.00 settlement

based upon $871.51 medicals was reasonable.

At that time

Plaintiff agreed to accept $7,500.00 as a settlement of her
claim against Davies and Hothan.

There was no agreement to

dismiss this case against State Farm.
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It was because of State Farm's actions of claiming
the IRA employees as non-testimonial experts that appellant
in this case was unable to obtain discovery.

As stated on

page 5 of respondent's brief, on May 24, 1988, counsel for
Davies and Hothan sent copies of drafts from State Farm to
IRA, but those drafts did not identify the services
rendered.

In this way, State Farm effectively denied Pixton

access to information she needed not only to settle her
claim but to prosecute the trial itself.

This action by

State Farm clearly was structured to protect its interests
over those of its insured and could be found by a jury to
constitute bad faith.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT WAIVED
ANY CLAIM OF ERROR ON THE
DISMISSAL OF HER THIRD
CAUSE OF ACTION
Defendant's statement that Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint contained various unfounded allegations of fraud
is incorrect.

The affidavits of Plaintiff and Beck must,

for purposes of Summary Judgment, be taken as true.
Consequently, if the affidavits as filed were proper in all
respects and admissible Defendant's assertion fails.
Plaintiff failed to brief the issue of fraud and
did so in part because the District Court in the Order For
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Summary Judgment did not make mention of the Cause of Action
In Fraud.

However, the exact argument for reversing the

District Court's Order regarding the contract and good faith
causes of action applies to the claim for fraud.

There were

genuine issues of material facts which precluded summary
judgment.
POINT IV
THE AFFIDAVIT OF MILTON Q. BECK
DID RAISE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
In the typical third party claim there is no
privity of contract.

However, this case involving Pixton

obviously differs from the typical third party claim.

In

the first instance, this case is no different than the Beck
v. Farmers case.

When that case turned into an uninsured

motorist claim the insured's position was identical to that
of Pixton and State Farm.

Why should this case be treated

differently than Beck v. Farmers supra?

Mr. Beck's

affidavit and that of Pixton clearly dealt with the actions
of State Farm during the resolution and payment of PIP
benefits.

At that point there was obviously privity of

contract.

Defendant completely disregards the Plaintiff's

affidavit and misstates the facts concerning Beck's
affidavit.
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CONCLUSION
A reasonable expectation of Pixton from her
contract with State Farm was to have her PIP benefits paid.
Once those benefits are paid does State Farm's duty under
the contract end?

Is she not entitled to be provided with

any information needed to settle her third party claim
against Davies?

If the services provided by IRA were found

by a jury to be medical expenses and not file expenses,
wouldn't it follow logically that State Farm had an
obligation to provide her with that information so she could
intelligently assess the value of her case?

Would not the

mischaracterization of these expenses and or State Farm's
refusal to provide them to Pixton constitute bad faith?
The jury could find that State Farm's conduct of
delaying payment, mischaracterizing medical specials,
failing to provide copies of bills paid under PIP for claims
against the third party, failure to allow Pixton and her
attorney to characterize the bills, failure to inform Pixton
that the purpose of obtaining the medical release was in
preparation for defense of the third party claim and not
treatment, constituted intentional and outrageous acts,
justifying an award of consequential and punitive damages.
The foregoing actions of State Farm are not just
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failures to perform obligations under its contract with
Pixton but are violations of duties set forth by statute and
custom in the industry.

Consequently, Pixton should not be

limited to damages recoverable in contract.

The District

Court's Summary Judgment should be reversed and the
Plaintiff allowed to proceed with her claim for "bad faith"
and "fraud".

Respectfully submitted this £ /
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to Philip R.
Fishier, Stephen J. Trayner, Attorney's for Respondents,
Strong & Hanni, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this
1990.
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